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I. INTRODUCTION
This comment examines the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
decision, State ex rel. Brandon L. v. Moats,' a recent case upholding West
Virginia's grandparent's visitation statute. In Brandon L., the court upheld this
statute in light of Troxel v. Granville,2 the United States Supreme Court decision
invalidating a Washington state nonparental visitation statute. The West
Virginia Supreme Court held that West Virginia's Grandparent Visitation Act
does not interfere with the parental fundamental liberty interest in the care, cus-
tody, and control of children. Reasoning that West Virginia's statute is more
1 551 S.E.2d 674 (W. Va. 2001).
2 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
3 Brandon L., 551 S.E.2d at 685.
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narrowly tailored than the "breathtakingly broad" statute invalidated in Troxel,
the court held that it was constitutional.4 The supreme court noted that West
Virginia's statute requires a trial court to make two determinations: (1) that visi-
tation is in the best interests of the child, and (2) that visitation will not substan-
tially interfere with the parent-child relationship.5 Additionally, West Virginia's
statute includes a list of twelve specific and one general factor that a court must
consider in deciding whether to grant a visitation petition.6 The Brandon L.
court concluded that this list of determinative factors renders the statute nar-
rowly tailored enough to be constitutional.7 Relying on precedent, the court also
held that adoption of the grandchild has no legal effect on standing to sue under
the grandparent visitation statute.8
This case comment addresses the significance of Brandon L. in the areas
of parental rights and substantive due process jurisprudence. Part H focuses on
the historical, social, and legal background of grandparent visitation statutes
generally and in West Virginia. Part Il examines in detail the United States
Supreme Court decision in Troxel v. Granville. Next, Part IV discusses the
West Virginia Supreme Court decision in Brandon L. and its significance in
light of the Troxel decision. In Part V, this comment will survey how other ju-
risdictions have applied the Troxel decision to their own grandparent visitation
statutes in comparison to the West Virginia Supreme Court. Finally, Part VI
questions the constitutionality of grandparent's visitation rights legislation con-
sidering the substantive due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment
and the holding in Troxel. Part VI will also discuss the future of litigation in
this area.
II. HISTORICAL, SOCIAL, AND LEGAL BACKGROUND OF GRANDPARENT
VISITATION RIGHTS
In the last several decades, the composition of the typical American
family has changed drastically with the increase of the divorce rate.9 In light of
this domestic upheaval, many families and children have turned to grandparents
for stability. Today, about 70 million Americans are grandparents, and that
number is expected to grow to 80 million by 2010.10 That Americans are living
4 Id.
5 Id. at 685-86.
6 Id. at 684-85. See factors listed infra note 153.
7 See Brandon L., 551 S.E.2d at 685.
8 See id. at 682.
9 See Sara Elizabeth Culley, Troxel v. Granville and its Effect on the Future of Grandparent
Visitation Statutes, 27 J. LEGIS. 237, 239 (2001); Michael Quintal, Court-Ordered Families: An
Overview of Grandparent Visitation Statutes, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 835, 835 (1995).
10 See The Communication Project, Fast Facts on Grandparenting & Intergenerational Men-
toring, at http://www.tcpnow.com/specialreports/fastfacts.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2002).
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longer and healthier lives also alters the state of grandparenthood in our country.
Moreover, as the number of older Americans grows, so too does interest in sen-
ior-centered legislation." Accordingly, the so-called "gray lobby" has become
one of the most influential groups in the country.' 2 Out of these monumental
sociological shifts-the increase in number and power of senior citizens and the
change in family make-up-has grown the grandparent visitation movement. In
the last four decades, grandparents have bound together to advocate legislation
that favors grandparents' rights to have regular visitation with their grandchil-
dren.
A. Social Changes and Grandparenthood
Grandparents serve an important role in the social structure of families
in the United States. Social historians and sociologists note the changes that
grandparenthood has undergone in the last century.' 3 A century ago, family
elders wielded more authority in family matters than today. 14 Furthermore, a
reciprocal exchange of resources and services existed in which parents raised
children, who, upon reaching adulthood, were expected to support their parents
as they aged.' 5 Scholars have attributed the current shift away from this social
structure to several different factors-the decline of the family farm, the eco-
nomic growth period following World War II, and the advent of the Social Se-
curity system-which made the pattern of intergenerational exchange less nec-
essary. 16
Today, Americans value the autonomy and financial independence of
family members.' 7 This independence arguably contributed to the formation of
1 See Elaine D. Ingulli, Grandparent Visitation Rights: Social Policies and Legal Rights, 87
W. VA. L. REv. 295, 296-98 (1985) (describing demographic changes that have increased the
political power of older Americans, who have higher life expectancies, more education, and are
more affluent than ever before); see also Maegen E. Peek, Grandparent Visitation Statutes: Do
Legislatures Know the Way to Carry the Sleigh Through the Wide and Drifting Law?, 53 FLA. L.
REv. 321, 322-23 (2001).
12 Erica L. Strawman, Grandparent Visitation: The Best Interests of the Grandparent, Child
and Society, 30 U. TOL. L. REv. 31, 34 (1998); Peek, supra note 11, at 323 (describing the influ-
ence of the elderly lobby and quoting House Representative Thomas Downey who remarked, "It is
a well known fact that seniors are the most active lobby in this country, and when it comes to
grandparents there is no one group more united in their purpose.").
13 See generally ANDREW J. CHERLIN & FRANK F. FURSTENBER, JR., THE NEW AMERICAN
GRANDPARENT: A PLACE IN THE FAMILY, A LIFE APART (1986).
14 Id. at 194.
15 Id.
16 See id. Of course, the children of older citizens still contribute to their parents' financial
security indirectly through their payments to the Social Security fund.
17 See id. at 195.
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what some have termed the "new social contract."' 18 This "contract" refers to
the social understanding within families that parents have the right to determine
the extent to which "grandparents will nurture their grandchildren."' 9 Some
commentators have decried the effects of this "social contract" because it de-
stroys the "primordial bond between grandparents and grandchildren., 20 These
commentators see grandparents as the foundation of the family and assert that
characterizations of "meddling in-laws" contribute to the degenerating role of
grandparents in their grandchildren's lives. 21 They stress the important role of
grandparents in keeping families together through an emotional support sys-
tem. 22 Although some scholars have cast doubt on the idea that grandparents in
America were ever as influential as they are in other countries such as Japan,
sociological changes in the last several decades have elevated the role of grand-
parents in this country and may lend some credence to the notion that grandpar-
ents serve as the foundation of the family.23
As the stability of the American family becomes more precarious, the
role of grandparents gains more significance. The increase in the divorce rate
creates a "functional role for grandparents similar to the roles they had when
higher parental mortality and lower standards of living necessitated more inter-
generational assistance. 24 Grandparents also provide emotional and financial
assistance for their families in the event of divorce.25 Thus, children of divorced
parents often develop stronger ties to their custodial grandparents than do chil-
dren in intact families. 26 The heightened importance of grandparents in the
wake of divorce demonstrates that "strong, functional intergenerational ties are
linked to family crises, low incomes, and instability rather than to health, pros-
perity, and stability. 27 Therefore, the fact that grandparents are taking a back-
18 ARTHUR KORNHABER, M.D. & KENNETH L. WOODWARD, GRANDPARENTS/GRANDCHILDREN:
THE VITAL CONNECTION 89-100 (1981).
19 Id. at 92.
20 Id. at 92; see also In re Nearhoof, 359 S.E.2d 587, 590 (W. Va. 1987).
21 See KORNHABER & WOODWARD, supra note 18, at 187.
22 Id.
23 See CHERLIN & FURSTENBER, supra note 13, at 194. See generally id. (discussing the role of
grandparents historically in America).
24 Id. at 197.
25 See AARP, Facts About Grandparents Raising Grandchildren, at
http://www.aarp.org/confacts/grandparents/grandfacts.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2002) (stating that
approximately 11% of grandparents also serve as caregivers to their grandchildren and that 4.5
million grandparents in the United States have custody of their grandchildren).
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seat role in the family in some cases may actually signal an advance in social
welfare.28
Another social factor greatly affecting the state of grandparenthood is
population changes. The number of grandparents and older Americans in gen-
eral is growing rapidly. Currently, about one third of adults in the United States
are grandparents.29 By the year 2030, one in every five Americans will be over
the age of 65 .30 This population change has led Andrew Churlin and Frank
Furstenber to posit a supply and demand theory related to grandparenthood in
their book, The New American Grandparent. In that book, Churlin and Fursten-
berg theorize that the rise in population of older Americans and the dramatic
decrease in the birth rate since the 1950s has resulted in a higher demand for
grandchildren.3' Since 1900, the percentage of Americans 65 years and older has
more than tripled (4.1% in 1900 to 12.7% in 1999).32 In 1900 there were 3.1
million people 65 years and older; by 1999 that number had risen to 34.5 mil-
lion.33 With older Americans living longer and the birthrate declining, the de-
mand for grandchildren has risen while the supply has diminished. This demo-
graphic reversal from a century ago alters the strategies that grandparents adopt
in their family relationships. 34 Sociologists have suggested that grandparents
may become more accommodating in their relations with their children and
more circumspect about the norm of noninterference in order to maintain family
ties.35 Maintaining close relationships with their grandchildren has become in-
creasingly important to grandparents in light of these considerations, giving rise
to grandparents who are more involved in their grandchildrens' lives and who
demand legal visitation "rights."
All of these sociological factors have combined to create a legal climate
in which grandparents and parents each assert fundamental rights to children.36
Many civil actions involving grandparent visitation statutes express the friction
between the competing ideas of, on one hand, grandparents having independent
rights to their grandchildren, founded in biology and morality, and on the other
28 Id.
29 See The Communication Project, supra note 10.
30 Id.
31 See CHERLIN & FURSTENBER, supra note 13, at 201-04.
32 The Communication Project, supra note 10.
33 Id.
34 CHERLIN & FURSTENBER, supra note 13, at 202.
35 See id. at 203. This noninterference is similar to what Komhaber and Woodward term the
"new social contract." For a fuller discussion of Cherlin and Furstenber's study on grandparents,
see Karen Czapanskiy, Grandparents, Parents and Grandchildren: Actualizing Interdependency
in Law, 26 CONN. L. REv. 1315, 1322-31 (1994).
36 See, e.g., Coalition for the Restoration of Parent's Rights, at http://www.parentsrights.org
(last visited Nov. 8, 2002).
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hand, grandparents having no separate legal rights because parents have the fun-
damental and exclusive right to raise their children as they wish. However, as
grandparents have become an increasingly powerful lobbying group in this
country, they have used their influence to get visitation legislation passed in
every state.37 In 1978, the "elderly lobby" successfully advocated a joint resolu-
tion of Congress asking the President to proclaim a national Grandparent's
Day. 38 On September 9, 1979 Jimmy Carter declared,
Grandparents are our continuing tie to the near-past, to the
events and beliefs and experiences that so strongly affect our
lives and the world around us. Whether they are our own or
surrogate grandparents who fill some of the gaps in our mobile
society, our senior generation also provides our society a link to
our national heritage and traditions.39
Today, more grandparents than ever before live longer and more afflu-
ent lives, have more leisure time, and greatly value their relationships with their
grandchildren. With their large numbers, grandparents have become a powerful
force in developing grandparent-friendly legislation that bestows independent
legal visitation rights with grandchildren.
B. Common Law
Under common law, grandparents had no legal right to visit their grand-
children.4° Instead, the common law favored parental autonomy in making deci-
sions about child-rearing.41 This rule was justified on the basis that thrusting a
child in the middle of a conflict between parents and grandparents would not
further the child's interests.42 Therefore, under common law, parents had only a
moral duty to allow visitation with grandparents, and courts could not truncate a
37 See Culley, supra note 9, at 238; Strawman, supra note 12, at 33.
38 See Peek, supra note 11, at 322-23.
39 DR. RuTH K. WESTHEIMER & DR. STEVEN KAPLAN, GRANDPARENTHOOD 1 (1998) (quoting
President Jimmy Carter proclaiming Grandparents Day). Interestingly, Grandparents Day was first
proclaimed in West Virginia by then Governor Arch Moore in 1973 in response to a campaign
initiated by Marian McQuade of Fayette County. Thereafter, McQuade lobbied for a national
proclamation, which culminated in the proclamation of National Grandparents Day in 1978. CTA,
Inc., History & Meaning: Grandparent's Day, at http://www.ctainc.com/Articles/article9.htm (last
visited Nov. 8, 2002); see also National Grandparents Day Council, National Grandparents Day,
at http://www.grandparents-day.com/ (providing information about Grandparents Day).
40 See Quintal, supra note 9, at 835-36; see also King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 632 (K.Y.
1992).
41 See Peek, supra note 11, at 324-25 (explaining the parental rights doctrine basis of common
law preference for parental autonomy).
42 See id. at 324.
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parent's right to deny visitation.43 This tide began to change in the 1960s with
the introduction of grandparent visitation statutes. 44
West Virginia common law followed the majority view of nonparental
rights. The West Virginia Supreme Court decided only a few cases involving
grandparent visitation rights before the enactment of the Grandparent Visitation
Act. In 1978, the court held in Brotherton v. Boothe45 that "[a] parent who prop-
erly performs his parental duties has the right to determine with whom his child
will associate." 6 Further, the supreme court asserted that a court that decrees
visitation with a child to a nonparent over the objections of the child's parent
"exceeds its authority. 47 Brotherton was upheld in 1979 in Jeffries v. Jeffries.48
Therefore, until the passage of legislation to the contrary, grandparents in West
Virginia had no legal right to visit their grandchildren.
C. West Virginia Statutory Law
After the decisions in Brotherton and Jeffries, the West Virginia legisla-
ture enacted the first grandparent visitation rights statute in 1980.49 This statute
altered the common law to give grandparents the legal right to seek visitation in
certain circumstances.5° West Virginia Code section 48-2-15 allowed a court to
order grandparent visitation as a part of a divorce or annulment proceeding in-
volving the custody of minor children where the grandparents were related to
the child through a party whose whereabouts are unknown or who failed to ap-
pear and defend the cause of action.51 Section 48-2B-1 allowed grandparents to
petition for visitation at any time regardless of whether a divorce or annulment
proceeding was being conducted, as long as the parent of the grandchild was
deceased.52 This statute allowed the court to order "reasonable and seasonable
43 See Susan Tomaine, Troxel v. Granville: Protecting Fundamental Parental Rights While
Recognizing Changes in the American Family, 50 CATH. U. L. REv. 731, 735 (2001).
44 See Culley, supra note 9, at 238-40.
45 250 S.E.2d 36 (W. Va. 1978).
46 Id. at 38.
47 Id. at 37.
48 253 S.E.2d 689 (W. Va. 1979) (holding that grandparents have no legal right to custody or
to visit and communicate with a grandchild over the parent's objections).
49 See Michelle M. Price, Note, West Virginia's New Grandparent Visitation Statute: A Step in
the Right Direction, 95 W. VA. L. REv. 535, 53741 (1992) (discussing the common law and
legislative history of West Virginia's grandparent visitation statute).
50 Id. at 539.
51 See id. at 535; see also W. VA. CODE § 48-2-15 (1980).
52 See Price, supra note 49, at 538; see also W. VA. CODE § 48-2B-1 (1980) (amended 1992)
(current version at § 48-10-101 (2001)).
20031
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visitation rights ... as the court may deem proper and in the best interest of the
child or children.,
53
In In re Nearhoof,54 the West Virginia Supreme Court recognized that
sections 48-2B-1 and 48-2-15 create an independent right in the grandparent to
seek visitation with a child. 55 At issue in that case was whether adoption pre-
cludes granting grandparents' visitation rights when the mother of a child is
deceased and the natural father's second wife seeks to adopt the child. The su-
preme court held that a court may order reasonable visitation with the children
of a grandparent's deceased child where the grandchild has been adopted by the
spouse of the deceased child's former spouse.56 Thus, the court concluded that
adoption does not sever the grandparents' legal rights to visitation.57 This deci-
sion signaled a retreat from the majority view that adoption severs all family
ties.58
Since the first grandparent visitation rights legislation enactment in
1980, the West Virginia legislature has twice amended the original statute and
introduced new legislation on this subject. In 1992, new, more expansive legis-
lation was enacted.59 These changes permitted grandparent visitation in five
situations:60 (1) where divorce, annulment, or separate maintenance is ordered;
(2) upon abandonment, abrogation, or judicial preclusion of parental visitation;
(3) where a parent is deceased; (4) where the minor child has resided with the
grandparent, and (5) where the parents are unwed.61 The expanded statute also
required the courts to consider the following factors in determining visitation:
"(1) the amount of previous contact between the grandparent and the child; (2)
whether such visitation would interfere with the parent-child relationship; and
(3) the overall effect of grandparent visitation on the child's best interests. 62 In
response to this legislation, commentators suggested that the legislature should
provide a concrete list of factors that the courts must use to guide the otherwise
53 W. VA. CODE § 48-2B-1 (1980) (amended 1992) (current version at § 48-10-101 (2001)).
54 359 S.E.2d 587 (W. Va. 1987).
55 See id. at 590; see also Price, supra note 49, at 540.
56 Nearhoof, 359 S.E.2d at 592.
57 See id. For more information on the adoption issue, see infra Part IV.
58 See Nearhoof, 359 S.E.2d at 591 n.5 (citing Ingulli, supra note 11, at 314-15, and explain-
ing the majority rule for adoption, i.e., stepparent adoptions terminate visitation rights of natural
grandparents).
59 See Price, supra note 49, at 541.
60 See id. at 542.
61 W. VA. CODE §§ 48-2B-2 to -6 (1992) (current version at § 48-10-101 (2001)); see Price,
supra note 49, at 542-44. The code also lists conditions that must be present for visitation to be
ordered.
62 Price, supra note 49, at 545.
[Vol. 105
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subjective determination of the "best interests" of the child. 63 Other jurisdic-
tions had already adopted statutes that listed factors to aid courts in making the
subjective "best interests of the child" determination.
64
Finally, in 1998, the West Virginia legislature adopted a list of thirteen
factors to consider in determining whether to grant visitation to a grandparent.65
West Virginia's current statute has twelve separate and fairly detailed sections.
66
The statute allows a grandparent to seek visitation-even when the family is
intact-upon a finding that the visitation would be in the best interests of the
child and would not substantially interfere with the parent-child relationship.67
This statutory scheme is similar to legislation adopted in other states as it relies
primarily on the traditional "best interests of the child" analysis.
III. TROXEL V. GRANVILLE AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF GRANDPARENT
VISITATION STATUTES
To alter common law limitations on nonparental visitation rights, every
state in the nation has adopted some form of grandparent's visitation legisla-
tion.68 However, this legislation's constitutionality has come into question since
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Troxel v. Granville.69 In Troxel,
the Court found Washington's grandparent visitation statute unconstitutional.7 °
The controversy in that case arose between a mother and the paternal grandpar-
ents of her children. 7' Tommie Granville and Brad Troxel, who were unmar-
ried, had two daughters.72 After their relationship ended in 1991, Brad lived
63 See id. at 548.
64 See id. at 548 n.65.
65 W. VA. CODE § 48-2B-6 (1998) (current version at § 48-10-601 (2001)).
66 W. VA CODE §§ 48-10-101 to -1201 (2001). The domestic relations laws were recodified
by 2001 W. Va. Acts 91. Sections 48-2B-1 to -12 were recodified as §§ 48-10-101 to -1201 as of
September 1, 2001.
67 W.VA. CODE § 48-10-501 (2001).
68 See Bryan Thomas White, Note, Muddling Through the Murky Waters of Troxel: Will
Grandparent Visitation Statutes Sink or Swim?, 39 FAM. CT. REV. 104, 115 n.5 (2001) (listing
every state's code provisions for grandparents visitation rights); see also Troxel v. Granville, 530
U.S. 57, 74 n.* (2000).
69 530 U.S. 57 (2000). See generally Eric B. Martin, Comment, Grandma Got Run Over by
the Supreme Court: Suggestions for a Consitutional Nonparental Visitation Statute After Troxel v.
Granville, 76 WASH. L. REV. 571 (2001); Terra L. Henry Sapp, Comment, Grandparent Visitation
Statutes in the Aftermath of Troxel v. Granville, 17 J. AM. AcAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 121 (2001);
Tomaine, supra note 43.
70 530 U.S. at 73-74 (declaring Washington Revised Code § 26.10.160(3) (1994) unconstitu-
tional).
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with his parents and brought his daughters there for weekend visits on a regular
basis until he committed suicide in 1993. 73 Initially, Brad's parents continued to
see their granddaughters regularly. After about five months, however, Tommie
Granville informed the Troxels that she wanted to limit their visits to one short
visit per month.74 The Troxels filed a petition for visitation, which the Superior
Court granted.75  Granville appealed to the Washington Court of Appeals,
which, finding visitation in the children's best interests, remanded the action to
the Superior Court.76 Thereafter, the Washington Court of Appeals reversed the
visitation order finding that the Troxels lacked standing.77 The Washington
Supreme Court then granted the Troxel's petition for review of the constitu-
tional issues and found the statute unconstitutional.78 During the course of this
litigation, Granville married and her husband legally adopted the children.79
In the plurality opinion authored by Justice O'Connor, the Supreme
Court reiterated its view that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause
"includes a substantive component that 'provides heightened protection against
government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty inter-
ests. ,80 The Court also acknowledged the fundamental liberty interest that par-
ents have in the care, custody, and control of their children as "perhaps the old-
est of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court." 81 Although
the Court's foregoing discussion clearly suggested that it would apply strict
scrutiny to the Washington statute, the Court failed to articulate the standard of
review.82 Rather than specifying a level of scrutiny, the Court used oblique ref-
erences to "heightened protection" without ever defining that standard.83
Instead of deciding that the statute was a per se invalid interference with
a fundamental parental due process right, the Court invalidated the statute as it
applied to Tommie Granville.84 The Court found fault with Washington's stat-
73 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60.
74 Id. at 60-61.
75 Id. at 61.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 62.
78 Id. at 63.
79 Id. at 62.
80 Id. at 65 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997)).
81 Id. at 65-66.
82 See id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring).
83 White, supra note 68, at 108-09. Generally, under strict scrutiny the statute must serve a
compelling government interest and be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest, and under ra-
tional basis review, the statute must be rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Id. at
108.
84 See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73-75.
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ute in two areas.85 First, the statute stated in "breathtakingly broad" terms that
"any person may petition the court for visitation rights at any time."86 Second,
the statute did not require that a court accord any special weight to the parent's
decision about the best interests of the child.8 7 In its discussion, the Court con-
centrated on the lack of consideration of parental preference.88
The Court found it problematic that "[iun effect, the judge placed on
Granville, the fit custodial parent, the burden of disproving that visitation would
be in the best interest of her daughters., 89 The Court asserted that instead of
placing this burden on parents, the statute should reflect a presumption that "fit"
parents act in the best interests of their children. 90 In fact, the Court explained
that "so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit),
there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private
realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent to make the best
decisions concerning the rearing of that parent's children." 91  Therefore, the
Court concluded that if a "fit" parent's decision about visitation comes under
review, the court "must accord at least some special weight to the parent's own
determination., 92 As the statute was written, it placed "the best-interest deter-
mination solely in the hands of the judge. Should the judge disagree with the
parent's estimation of the child's best interests, the judge's view necessarily
prevails. 93 Moreover, the Court cited the Washington Supreme Court finding
that Washington's statute is unconstitutional because it "requires no threshold of
harm," even though the "Constitution permits a State to interfere with the right
of parents to rear their children only to prevent harm or potential harm to a
child."94 However, the Court did not address the necessity of finding harm in
the opinion. The Court also emphasized that Granville did not intend to elimi-
nate visitation completely, but rather that she only wanted to limit the visitation
85 Id. ("[Washington Revised Code] [slection 26.10160(3) provides: 'Any person may petition
the court for visitation rights at any time including, but not limited to, custody proceedings. The
court may order visitation rights for any person when visitation may serve the best interest of the
child whether or not there has been any change of circumstances."').
86 Id. at 67 (quoting Washington's statute).
87 Id.
88 Id. at 69.
89 Id.
90 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68-69 (citing Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979)).
91 Id.
92 Id. at 70.
93 Id. at 67.
94 Id. at 63. The U.S. Supreme Court did not expressly discuss this aspect of the statute in its
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with the Troxels. 95 As the Court noted, in many jurisdictions courts may only
award visitation when a parent has denied visitation.96 Therefore, little factual
basis existed for awarding visitation in this case.
On those grounds, the Court found that Washington's statute was un-
constitutional because of its "sweeping breadth" and "the application of that
broad, unlimited power" in the specific facts of the case.97 By finding the
Washington statute "breathtakingly broad" and invalid as applied to Granville,
the plurality sidestepped the question of whether all nonparental visitation stat-
utes must include a showing of harm or potential harm to the child before visita-
tion is awarded.98 The Court also avoided defining the "precise scope of the
parental due process right in the visitation context."99 Instead, the Court recog-
nized that "much state-court adjudication in this context occurs on a case-by-
case basis" and decided that it would be better to allow state courts to continue
interpreting and applying their own state statutes. 1°° Thus, the Court did not
find all third-party visitation statutes per se invalid, nor did it address the scope
of parental rights in the context of third party visitation.
Justice Souter wrote a concurring opinion in which he asserted that the
Washington statute should be invalidated on its face, not just in its application to
Granville. 01 He found the statute to be an unconstitutional infringement on
parental due process rights. Justice Thomas also concurred in the judgment and
wrote separately to point out that the plurality did not articulate an appropriate
standard of review. 1°2 Thomas would apply strict scrutiny to infringements of
fundamental rights. 10 3 Moreover, Justice Thomas declared that Washington
lacked even a legitimate interest in "second-guessing a fit parent's decision re-
garding visitation with third parties."' 4
Justice Stevens authored a dissenting opinion, in which he initially as-
serted that the Court should have denied certiorari because "there was no press-
ing need to review a State Supreme Court decision that merely requires the state
legislature to draft a better statute."' 05 He then intimated that parental rights
95 See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 71.
96 See id. (citing the statutes of Mississippi, Oregon, and Rhode Island).
97 Id. at 73.
98 Id. at 57, 73.
99 Id. at 73.
100 Id.
101 See id. at 76 (Souter, J., concurring).
102 Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring).
103 See id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
104 Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
105 Id. at 80-81 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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have never been absolute, and suggested that children might have a fundamental
interest in "preserving established familial or family-like bonds."' 1 6  Justice
Scalia also authored a dissenting opinion in which he stated his belief "that the
State has no power to interfere with parent's authority over the rearing of their
children . *...,0 Nonetheless, Scalia asserted that the Constitution does not
empower the Supreme Court to deny legal effect to laws that infringe on an un-
enumerated right.'0 8 Scalia claimed that expanding substantive due process to
include the parental right to exclude third parties from visitation would create
new law, which he felt would be better left to state legislators who "have the
great advantages of doing harm in a more circumscribed area.. .. ,,109
The fragmented, plurality opinion draws attention to the differing ap-
proaches of the Justices to parental rights. Lower courts across the country re-
flect these varying approaches, arriving at surprisingly different results in their
applications of Troxel.110
IV. THE WEST VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT APPLIES TROXEL TO ITS
GRANDPARENT VISITATION STATUTE
With its refusal to articulate a standard of review and its fact-based rea-
soning, the Supreme Court's decision in Troxel left state courts with precious
little guidance. Since the Troxel decision, several states, including West
Virginia, have had the opportunity to apply its reasoning to challenges of grand-
parent visitation statutes."' West Virginia addressed the question in State ex
rel. Brandon L. v. Moats.112 In this case, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals found that the Grandparent Visitation Act does not violate a parent's
substantive due process right of liberty to exercise care, custody, and control of
his or her children without undue interference from the state. 11
3
A. Facts and Procedural Background of Brandon L.
Brandon L., like Troxel, involved a visitation petition by paternal
grandparents following a stepparent adoption. In this case, Carol Jo L. and
106 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 88 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
107 Id. at 92 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
108 See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
109 Id. at 93 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
It0 The disparity in lower court approaches will be explored infra Part V.
III See infra Part V (discussing how other states have applied Troxel to their grandparent visita-
tion statutes).
112 551 S.E.2d 674 (W. Va. 2001).
113 Id. at 685.
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David Allen C., birth parents of Alexander David, divorced in 1998.' 14 Carol L.
was awarded sole care, custody and control of Alexander, and David Allen C.
was awarded visitation rights.1 15 In accordance with the divorce order, David
Allen's visitation rights were exercised under the supervision of Linda K, his
mother (the child's paternal grandmother).1 16 In February 2000, Carol Jo L.
remarried, and her new husband legally adopted the child in May of 2000.117
After the adoption, Carol L. (the mother) sent Linda K. (grandmother) a letter
informing her that she no longer had grandparent's rights and could no longer
visit Alexander."
8
The grandparents filed an action in circuit court on May 23, 2000 seek-
ing visitation rights." 9 The parents then entered a motion to dismiss, claiming
that the grandparents did not have standing under the Grandparent Visitation
Act. 20 Consequently, the family law master recommended dismissal on those
grounds. 2 1 Afterward, the grandparents sought review of this recommended
disposition before the circuit court. 22 The circuit court rejected the family law
master's recommendation and recommitted the matter to the family law master
for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether visitation should be granted.
123
The case reached the West Virginia Supreme Court when the parents sought a
writ of prohibition to prevent the matter from proceeding to the evidentiary
hearing.
124
B. Discussion of Brandon L.
In its majority opinion, authored by Justice Albright, the West Virginia
Supreme Court addressed two broad topics: standing and the constitutionality of
the statute. 25 It found that the grandparents had standing to sue and that the




118 Id. at 677. David Allen C. (the biological father) "is purportedly opposed to contact between
his son and Respondents because he 'doesn't want [Alexander David] to turn out like ... [he
did.]' Id. at 677 n.7.





124 Id. at 676.
125 Id. at 676-88.
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statute was not invalidated by Troxel. 12 6  As an initial matter, the court ad-
dressed the appropriate standard of review for a writ of prohibition. 27 The par-
ents contended that the grandparents had no standing to seek visitation rights
and that the lower court had no jurisdiction to hear this matter. 28 Alternatively,
the parents asserted that the Act was unconstitutional on its face and as applied
to them.129 For both of these contentions, the court found that a writ of prohibi-
tion was procedurally appropriate.
130
1. Standing
In its analysis, the supreme court first discussed the issue of standing
and concluded that the grandparents did have standing to sue under the Grand-
parent Visitation Act. The parents argued that West Virginia Code section 48-
2B-9 governed the issue of standing. 3 1 This statute, entitled "Effect of remar-
riage or adoption on visitation for grandparents," states in pertinent part: "If a
child who is subject to a visitation order under this article is later adopted, the
order for grandparent visitation is automatically vacated when the order for
adoption is entered, unless the adopting parent is a stepparent, grandparent or
other relative of the child."' 132 However, the court concluded that this section did
not address standing, and instead pointed to section 48-2B-3, which allows a
grandparent to apply to the circuit court for an order granting visitation with a
grandchild. 133  Further, the court cited section 48-2B-4(b), which governs pro-
cedures to be used when the visitation petition is not included as part of another
proceeding (such as a divorce or legal separation). 34 Additionally, the court
noted that section 48-2B-4(c) contains procedures that apply when a petition is
filed under section 48-2B-4(b). These procedural requirements stipulate that
126 Brandon L., 551 S.E.2d at 676-88.
127 See id. at 677.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 See id. With respect to the jurisdictional challenge, the court cited to Hoover v. Berger, 483
S.E.2d 12 (W. Va. 1996), which states that "[pirohibition lies only to restrain inferior courts from
proceeding in causes over which they have no jurisdiction, or, in which, having jurisdiction, they
are exceeding their legitimate powers ...." (quotation omitted). For the constitutional challenge,
State ex. rel. Wilmoth v. Gustke, 373 S.E.2d 484, 484 n.1 (W. Va. 1988) governed: "[p]rohibition
may be used as a means to test the constitutionality of a statute."
131 See Brandon L., 551 S.E.2d at 677.
132 Id. at 677-78. For the purposes of discussing the court opinion, this comment will refer to
the domestic relations law before it was recodified under W. VA. CODE § 48-10-101 to -1201
(2002).
133 Id. at 678.
134 See id. at 678-79. This section has been recodified as W. VA. CODE § 48-10-402 (2002).
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when such a petition is filed, "the matter shall be styled 'In re grandparent visi-
tation of petitioner' s(s') name(s).'" 13 5 Additionally, section 48-2B-4(d) provides
for the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the child "to assist the court in
determining the best interests of the child regarding grandparent visitation."'
' 36
The court read these inclusions as evidence that the legislature intended that
grandparents could seek visitation even if no other domestic relations proceed-
ing was pending.
137
The parents also asserted that the state's adoption statute precluded the
grandparents' standing. In support of this argument, the parents raised section
48-4-11, which provides that upon the entry of an adoption order
any person previously entitled to parental rights, any parent or
parents by any previous legal adoption, and the lineal or collat-
eral kindred of any such person, parent or parents, except any
such person or parent who is the husband or wife of the peti-
tioner for adoption, shall be divested of all legal rights.
138
However, the court disregarded this provision, finding that section 48-2B-1 of
the Grandparent Visitation Act makes it clear that it is the exclusive legislation
regarding grandparent visitation. 139 The court also reasoned that section 48-4-
11, which was enacted in 1882 "was not written with concern for the correlative
divestment of a grandparent's rights to visitation." 140 Finally, the court pointed
out that because the legislature had twice amended the Grandparent Visitation
Act (which was first enacted in 1980) since the last amendments to this section
of the adoption statute were made in 1984, it did not perceive any conflict be-
tween the statutes.' 
41
Furthermore, the court cited the reasoning used in In re Nearhoof,"42 a
case that directly addressed the issue of whether the adoption statutes and the
grandparent act were in contradiction. The Nearhoof court asserted:
135 Brandon L., 551 S.E.2d at 678.
136 Id.
137 See id. at 680.
138 Id.; see W. VA. CODE § 48-4-11 (1984).
139 Brandon L., 551 S.E.2d at 680 ("[I]t is the express intent of the Legislature that the provi-
sions for grandparent visitation that are set forth in this article are exclusive." (quoting W. VA.
CODE § 48-2B-1 (1998) (current version at § 48-10-102 (2001)).
140 Id. at 681.
141 See id.
142 359 S.E.2d 587 (W. Va. 1987). In re Nearhoof relied heavily on an emotional argument
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It is a biological fact that grandparents are bound to their grand-
children by the unbreakable links of heredity. It is common
human experience that the concern and interest grandparents
take in the welfare of their grandchildren far exceeds anything
explicable in purely biological terms. A very special relation-
ship often arises and continues between grandparents and
grandchildren.... Visits with a grandparent are often a precious
part of a child's experience and there are benefits which de-
volve upon the grandchild from the relationship with his grand-
parents which he cannot derive from any other relationship.
Neither the Legislature nor this Court is blind to human truths
which grandparents and grandchildren have always known. 1
43
In Nearhoof, the court held that "rather than being in conflict, the adoption and
grandparent statutes had the same underlying objective: 'To provide substitute
parental relationships for children who have been deprived of the benefits of a
healthy relationship with one or both natural parents.""" Following precedent,
the court held that the legislature did not intend for these statutes to be in con-
flict and found that the grandparents did have standing. 45 Accordingly, in
Brandon L., the court denied the parents' challenge to the grandparents' stand-
ing.
2. Constitutionality of the Grandparent Visitation Act
The petitioners claimed that the act was unconstitutional both on its face
and as applied, in light of Troxel v. Granville. 146 To address this claim, the court
first reviewed Troxel. It examined the Supreme Court's analysis of the Wash-
ington statute invalidated in Troxel and found that, in comparison, West Vir-
ginia's statute was sufficiently narrowly drawn to pass constitutional muster.
147
As the court pointed out, the United States Supreme Court did not conclude that
the Washington statute was unconstitutional on its face, but only as it applied to
the facts of that particular case.148 Nor did the Supreme Court find all nonparen-
tal visitation statutes per se invalid. 149 Therefore, West Virginia's grandparent
143 Id. at 592 (quoting Mimkon v. Ford, 332 A.2d 199, 204-05 (N.J. 1975)).
144 Brandon L., 551 S.E.2d at 681 (quoting Nearhoof, 359 S.E.2d at 591).
145 See id. at 681-82.
146 530 U.S. 57 (2002). Because of the procedural posture of this case, the court only ad-
dressed the facial challenge.
147 See Brandon L., 551 S.E.2d at 683.
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visitation statute was held to be constitutional primarily because it was better
drafted than Washington's statute.
150
The court differentiated West Virginia's statute from Washington's
"simplistic and broadly-worded two-sentence statute," noting that West
Virginia's law does not allow "any person" to petition for visitation, but rather,
only grandparents may petition for visitation.1 5 1 Moreover, the statute requires
an affirmative determination that such visitation "would not substantially inter-
fere with the parent-child relationship."' 52 The Brandon L. court also found it
important that the West Virginia statute lists twelve specific and one general
factor to help the trial court determine whether visitation should be granted, in
addition to the threshold requirements that visitation is in the best interests of
the child and does not substantially interfere with the parent-child relation-
ship.
153
150 See id. at 684-85.
151 Id. at 684. (quoting Troxel, 530 U.S. at 57).
152 Id.
153 See id. at 684-85. The "[factors to be considered in making a determination as to a grant of
visitation to a grandparent" are as follows:
(1) The age of the child;
(2) The relationship between the child and the grandparent;
(3) The relationship between each of the child's parents or the person with
whom the child is residing and the grandparent;
(4) The time which has elapsed since the child last had contact with the
grandparent;
(5) The effect that such visitation will have on the relationship between the
child and the child's parents or the person with whom the child is residing;
(6) If the parents are divorced or separated, the custody and visitation ar-
rangement which exists between the parents with regard to the child;
(7) The time available to the child and his or her parents, giving consideration
to such matters as each parent's employment schedule, the child's schedule
for home, school and community activities, and the child's and parents' holi-
day and vacation schedule;
(8) The good faith of the grandparent in filing the motion or petition;
(9) Any history of physical, emotional or sexual abuse or neglect being per-
formed procured, assisted or condoned by the grandparent;
(10) Whether the child has, in the past, resided with the grandparent for a sig-
nificant period or periods of time, with or without the child's parent or par-
ents;
(11) Whether the grandparent has, in the past, been a significant caretaker for
the child, regardless of whether the child resided inside or outside of the
grandparent's residence;
(12) The preference of the parents with regard to the requested visitation; and
(13) Any other factor relevant to the best interests of the child.
W. VA. CODE § 48-2B-5(b)(1) to (13) (1998) (current version at § 48-10-502(1) to (13) (2000)).
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The court emphasized that one of the listed factors is "the preference of
the parents with regard to the requested visitation."1 54 This factor is notable
because the lack of consideration of parental preference was one of the signifi-
cant faults that the Troxel Court found in the Washington statute.' 55 The parents
argued that the delineation of the factors suggested that the legislature intended
for each of them to be given equal weight, but the court found no support for
this argument. 56 Although the procedural stance of the case did not afford the
opportunity to determine the amount of weight that should be attached to the
parental preference factor, the court suggested that in light of the Troxel deci-
sion, "'the court must accord at least some special weight to the parent's own
determination.'
1 57
The court also found that West Virginia's statute addressed almost
every concern raised by Troxel. Many of these concerns were alleviated by the
two-prong standard of best interests and lack of substantial interference with the
parent-child relationship.' 58 Because the Act requires a consideration of parental
preference and an initial determination that the visitation will not detrimentally
affect the parent-child relationship, the court asserted that the "constitutional
deficiencies presented by the Washington statute are not present here."'
' 59
To further establish the facial constitutionality of the statute, the court
continued to discuss its potential applications. First, the court examined the
statutory burden of proof requirements and the factor of "whether there has been
an established relationship between the child and his/her relative prior to the
subject litigation."'160 Although recognizing that the legislative purpose of
grandparent visitation statutes is to "'ensure the welfare of the children... by
protecting the relationships those children form with ... third parties' such as
grandparents," the court stated that the grandparents bear the burden of proving
that visitation will be in the best interest of the child and will not substantially
interfere with the parent-child relationship. 16 1 In the statute, the legislature in-
cluded a burden of proof standard requiring proof by a preponderance of the
evidence that the requested visitation is in the best interest of the child. 162 As the
154 Brandon L., 551 S.E.2d at 685 (referring to factor 12).
155 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68-69.
156 Brandon L., 551 S.E.2d at 685.
157 Id. (quoting Troxel, 530 U.S. at 70).
158 See id.; see also W. VA. CODE § 48-2B-5(a) (1998).
159 Brandon L., 551 S.E.2d at 686.
160 Id.; see W. VA. CODE § 48-2B-5(b)(2).
161 Brandon L, 551 S.E.2d at 686 (quoting Troxel, 530 U.S. at 64); see W. VA. CODE § 48-2B-
5(a).
162 See Brandon L, 551 S.E.2d at 685. The statute provides that if the parent through which
the grandparent is related to the child does not have or share custody or has visitation privileges,
then the grandparent will be awarded visitation if a preponderance of the evidence shows that
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court conceded, this burden will be difficult to meet where adoptions have pre-
ceded the visitation petition and even more difficult in the absence of an estab-
lished relationship between the grandparents and the children.163 Thus, the court
suggested that the grandparent's burden of proving that visitation will be in the
best interests of the child renders the act merely a small intrusion on parent's
liberty interest in the custody, care, and control of their children.
Second, the supreme court refrained the meaning of section 48-10-501,
which states that "[t]he circuit court shall grant reasonable visitation to a grand-
parent upon a finding that visitation would be in the best interests of the child
and would not substantially interfere with the parent-child relationship." 164 In
this regard, the court placed special emphasis on the significance of any inter-
ference with the parent-child relationship. 165 The court expressed that it would
be preferable for adults involved in visitation disputes to make agreements
without the intervention of the courts; however, it recognized that voluntary
agreements are not always possible. 166 The court further clarified that
the statute under consideration provides a comprehensive and
fair means by which the best interests of the children and the re-
lationships with their respective parents or grandparents can be
protected from harm resulting either from the inconsiderate or
excessive demands of grandparents or the obstinate or unrea-
sonable and insignificant objections of parents, any of which
may, on occasion, be driven more by emotion than pursuit of
proper interests of the children and their parents. 1
67
Recognizing these considerations, the supreme court urged lower courts
to be attentive to the need for careful and complete findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law when ruling on actions brought under the Act. 168 In so doing, the
court expanded the meaning of "substantial" so that this test will only be met by
interferences that the trial court determines to be serious, rather than inconse-
quential. The court found that this dual-pronged statutory scheme "constitutes a
visitation is in the best interests of the child. However, if the parent through which the grandpar-
ent is related to the child does have or share custody or exercise visitation privileges, then there is
a presumption that visitation privileges need not be extended to grandparents. This presumption
can be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence that grandparent visitation is in the best interests
of the child. See W. VA. CODE § 48-2b-7(a), (c) (1998) (current version at § 48-10-702 (2002)).
163 See Brandon L., 551 S.E.2d at 687.
164 W. VA. CODE § 48-10-501 (2002).
165 See Brandon L., 551 S.E.2d at 687.
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workable means by which the legitimate interests of the children in maintaining
a viable relationship with their grandparents and the liberty interests of parents
relative to the care, custody, and control of their children can be effectively ex-
amined, protected, and promoted."' 69
In summary, the majority held that West Virginia's visitation statute
passes constitutional muster because it permits only grandparents to petition for
visitation and because the Act requires the trial court to undertake a two-prong
analysis that examines the best interests of the child and the protection of the
parent-child relationship from substantial interference. 70 The court stressed that
if either prong of that two-prong test is not satisfied, then the petition for grand-
parent visitation fails.17 1 According to the court, because the statute requires an
initial determination that visitation will not detrimentally affect the parent-child
relationship and because parental preference is considered, the constitutional
problems found in Troxel are not present in West Virginia's statute. 172 There-
fore, West Virginia's grandparent visitation act was deemed constitutional in
light of the holding in Troxel.
173
Justice Davis submitted a vigorous dissent in which she expressed con-
cem about the effects the majority opinion would have on adoption law in the
state. 174 Previously, adoptions were considered a complete divestiture of an
adoptee's former familial and legal ties, but the majority's decision allowed a
legal relationship to survive an adoption by letting grandparents petition for
visitation of their former grandchildren.1 75 Justice Davis also expressed concern
about the security and finality of adoptions. 76 Additionally, Justice Davis as-
serted that the opinion should only be applied prospectively because it was a
departure from prior precedent and applying it retroactively would not provide
enough notice.
7
169 Id. at 687.
170 See Brandon L., 551 S.E.2d at 687.
171 Id. at 687-88.
172 The court does not address an as-applied challenge because of the procedural phase of the
case.
173 See W. Va. Grandparents Lose Battle, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Jan. 30, 2002, at 2D (report-
ing that the grandparent's visitation petition in this case after remand was denied).
174 See Brandon L., 551 S.E.2d at 688-92 (Davis, J., dissenting). Justice Maynard joined in the
dissenting opinion.
175 Id. at 688 (Davis, J., dissenting).
176 Id. at 688-91 (Davis, J., dissenting).
177 Id. at 688-92 (Davis, J., dissenting). A full discussion of the implications of this case to
adoption in West Virginia, while merited by this decision, is beyond the scope of this comment.
But see id. at 687 n.21 ("We simply do not foresee either the end of adoptions or a consequential
rash of ensuing litigation from grandparents seeking visitation rights as a result of this opinion.").
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V. TROXEL's OVERALL EFFECT ON GRANDPARENT VISITATION STATUTES
In the mid-1990s some commentators claimed that nonparental visita-
tion statutes had seen their high point, but the United State Supreme Court
breathed new life into these statutes with its holding in Troxel v. Granville1
78
The Court had the perfect opportunity to declare that all nonparental visitation
statutes impermissibly interfered with the parent's fundamental liberty interest
in the custody, care, and control of their children, but it declined to do so. Fur-
thermore, the Court did not articulate a standard of review, leaving state courts
struggling to follow Troxel's precedent. 179 Instead, the Court showed a prefer-
ence for case-by-case analysis in the area of parental rights.
Since the Troxel decision, several other states besides West Virginia
have applied the Court's reasoning to their own statutes. 80 Some states have
asserted that grandparent visitation rights are a minimal intrusion on parental
rights and have applied a rational basis standard of review.1 81 For instance, the
Missouri Court of Appeals upheld Missouri's grandparent visitation statute on
the basis that the intrusion on parental rights is "miniscule."' 182 That court found
it notable that the United States Supreme Court did not declare nonparental visi-
tation statutes per se violative of the Due Process Clause.' 83 As to the appropri-
ate standard of review, the Missouri court defended the use of the less demand-
ing "minimal intrusion" standard of review by asserting that Troxel did not
compel the use of strict scrutiny and that, in fact, "the plurality in Troxel
scarcely mentions the appropriate standard of review for such cases."' 84 Addi-
tionally, the court found Missouri's statute to be constitutional in comparison to
the statute invalidated in Troxel. The court pointed to the "differences in facts,
statutory language, and precedent, combined with the unanswered questions of
Troxel, [which] lead this court to conclude that the application of Missouri's
grandparent visitation statute in this case was constitutional and that the statute
itself remains viable post-Troxel."'' 85 Thus, Missouri's grandparent visitation
178 See, e.g., Sarah Norton Harpring, Wide-Open Grandparent Visitation Statutes: Is the Door
Closing?, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1659 (1994) (suggesting a trend toward states narrowing grandpar-
ent visitation statutes allowing petitions for visitation even where families are intact).
179 See Culley, supra note 9, at 246-47.
180 See White, supra note 68, at 109.
181 See Cabral v. Cabral, 28 S.W.3d 357 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000); see also GalIjour v. Harris, 795
So. 2d 350 (La. 2001); White, supra note 68, at 112.
182 See Cabral, 28 S.W.3d at 365.
183 See id. at 363.
184 See id. at 365-66.
185 See id. at 366.
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statute was upheld on two main grounds: (1) it satisfied a rational basis/minimal
intrusion test, and (2) it was better drafted than Washington's statute.1
86
Similarly, the Arizona Court of Appeals upheld Arizona's grandparent
visitation statute on the grounds that it required the court to give weight to the
parent's visitation decisions.' 87 The Arizona court also declined to use strict
scrutiny because Troxel did not require its use, and instead used a rational basis
standard of review.'8 8 Indeed, many other jurisdictions have taken advantage of
the considerable latitude afforded by the United States Supreme Court in Troxel
to uphold their states' statutes on the basis that they were more narrowly tailored
than Washington's, pointing out that Troxel did not find nonparental visitation
statutes facially invalid. 89 These courts conclude that under the traditional best
interests test, parental rights are not absolute.
Conversely, several states have declared their grandparent visitation
statutes unconstitutional in the aftermath of Troxel.190 For instance, in Sand v.
Santi, 191 the Supreme Court of Iowa followed the reasoning of Troxel and ex-
pressly applied strict scrutiny to its statute. 192 The court concluded that the stat-
186 See White, supra note 68, at 111-13.
187 See Jackson v. Tangreen, 18 P.3d 100, 104 (Ariz. 2000).
188 Id. at 106.
189 See, e.g., Jackson, 18 P.3d at 100; In re Marriage of Harris, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 127 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2001) (upholding statute on the basis that it is more narrow than Washington's), petition for
review granted, 37 P.3d 379 (Cal. 2002); Zeman v. Stanford, 789 So. 2d 798 (Miss. 2001) (up-
holding its grandparent visitation statute on the grounds that it was more narrowly drawn than
Washington's in Troxel); Currey v. Currey, 650 N.W.2d 273 (S.D. 2002) (upholding its grandpar-
ent visitation statute on grounds that it is not overbroad like Washington's statute); Lilley v.
Lilley, 43 S.W.3d 703 (Tex. 2001) (upholding statute more narrowly tailored than Washington's
statute); see also Rideout v. Riendeau, 761 A.2d 291 (Me. 2000) (applying strict scrutiny, grand-
parent visitation statute upheld because government has compelling interest and statute is nar-
rowly drawn).
190 See, e.g., Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 139 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (holding the grandparent
visitation statute unconstitutional as applied); Kyle 0. v. Donald R., 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 476 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2000) (holding grandparent visitation statute unconstitutional as applied); Wickham v.
Langman, 769 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2002) (statute is facially unconstitutional); Lulay v. Lulay, 739
N.E.2d 521 (Il1. 2000) (applying strict scrutiny and holding the grandparent visitation statute un-
constitutional as applied to the facts); Crafton v. Gibson, 752 N.E.2d 78 (Ind. 2001) (holding the
grandparent visitation statute unconstitutional as applied because it does not include a presump-
tion that fit parents act in the best interests of their children); Brice v. Brice, 754 A.2d 1132 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (holding its grandparent visitation statute unconstitutional as applied because
it did not require a showing that the parent was unfit); DeRose v. DeRose, 643 N.W.2d 259 (Mich.
Ct. App. 2002) (statute is unconstitutional because it affords no deference to parental preference),
appeal granted, SC: 121246, 2002 Mich. LEXIS 1673 (Mich. Oct. 8, 2002); Wilde v. Wilde, 775
A.2d 535 (N.J. 2001) (holding the grandparent visitation statute in unconstitutional as applied);
Hertz v. Hertz, 717 N.Y.S.2d 457 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000) (holding the grandparent visitation statute
facially unconstitutional on Due Process grounds), rev'd, 738 N.Y.S.2d 62 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
191 633 N.W.2d 312 (Iowa 2001).
192 Id. at 318.
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ute was unconstitutional because it did not require the presumption that "fit"
parents act in their child's best interests. 93 The court explained that, "[w]ithout
a threshold finding of unfitness, the statute effectively substitutes sentimentality
for constitutionality. It exalts the socially desirable goal of grandparent-
grandchild bonding over the constitutionally recognized right of parents to de-
cide with whom their children will associate."'194
In Illinois, a grandparent visitation statute was invalidated on different
constitutional grounds. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the burden of
litigating claims under Illinois's grandparent visitation statute results in an un-
constitutional infringement on parental substantive due process.' 95 The court
asserted that,
[t]he parents must presumably hire attorneys, and then present
evidence and defend their decision regarding the visitation be-
fore a trial court. The parents' authority over their children is
necessarily diminished by this procedure. This can only be
characterized as a significant interference with parents' funda-
mental right to make decisions regarding the upbringing of their
children.
196
Interestingly, the Troxel plurality opinion, as well as Justice Kennedy's
dissent, introduced this constitutional theory. According to Justice O'Connor,
"the burden of litigating a domestic relations proceeding can itself be 'so disrup-
tive of the parent-child relationship that the constitutional right of a custodial
parent to make certain basic determinations for the child's welfare becomes
implicated. '"1 97  The Court recognized that Granville's litigation costs were
"without a doubt already substantial," and therefore, to avoid any further bur-
dens on her parental rights, ordered, without remand, that entry of the visitation
order would be unconstitutional.198 Thus, the United States Supreme Court ac-
knowledged that the costs associated with litigating against grandparent visita-
tion statutes could be considered an impermissible infringement on parental
rights.' 99
193 See id. at 321.
194 Id. at 320; see also Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769, 773 (Ga. 1995) (finding Georgia's
grandparent visitation statute unconstitutional, noting that "there is insufficient evidence that
supports the proposition that grandparents' visitation with their grandchildren always promotes the
children's health or welfare" ).
195 See Lulay, 739 N.E.2d at 521.
196 Id. at 531-32.
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Taken as a whole, the cases decided after Troxel seem to indicate that
constitutional analysis of nonparent visitation statutes largely depends on the
standard of review applied and the scope of parental rights accorded by a given
court. These post-Troxel decisions demonstrate that within the analysis of
Troxel, courts may justifiably interpret their grandparent visitation statutes to be
either constitutional or unconstitutional. Through its fragmented opinion in
Troxel, the Supreme Court has created a safe harbor for state courts to interpret
their statutes broadly to give special weight to parental preference as to visita-
tion. 200 However, Troxel also left room for states to invalidate their statutes on
constitutional grounds, depending on the scope courts give to parental liberty
interests and whether the court adheres to the sentimental view of the role of
grandparents in children's lives.
Applying the former approach, the West Virginia Supreme Court upheld
its statute, emphasizing the importance of parental preference as one of the fac-
tors a court must consider in determining whether to grant visitation. 20 ' The
court noted that the placement of this factor did not necessarily suggest that it
should be weighed equally with the other factors-implying that it could be
given more weight:
[R]ather than making new law, we have merely interpreted the
act's existing provisions in light of the pronouncements made
by the United States Supreme Court in Troxel. And, as dis-
cussed in full above, we have found West Virginia's act to be
well within the constitutional concerns addressed in Troxel,
given the act's specific identification of parental preference as a
202factor which directly impacts on the issue of visitation.
Although the Brandon L. court did not articulate a rational basis stan-
dard, its emphasis on the burden of proof requirement found in West Virginia's
statute seems similar to the "minimal intrusion" analysis found in other jurisdic-
tions.2 °3 According to the Supreme Court of Appeals, in West Virginia, there is
a presumption that "fit" parents act in the best interests of their children because
grandparents must prove that visitation is in the best interests of the child by a
preponderance of the evidence. 204 In so doing, the court recast the meaning of
the statute in order to find it constitutional. This approach is authorized by
Troxel, which, with its failure to define the scope of parental rights, created the
opportunity for courts to redefine their own statutes so that they could be
200 See White, supra note 68, at 114; see also Brandon L., 551 S.E.2d at 685.
201 State ex rel. Brandon L. v. Moats, 551 S.E.2d 674, 687 (W. Va. 2000).
202 Id.
203 See id. at 685; see also Cabral v. Cabral, 28 S.W.3d 357 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
204 See W. VA. CODE § 48-10-702(a) (2002) ("the grandparent shall be granted visitation if a
preponderance of the evidence shows that visitation is in the best interests of the child").
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deemed constitutional. Essentially, the Troxel analysis calls for a comparison
between the statute in question and Washington's poorly worded, broad statute.
Therefore, West Virginia's grandparent visitation statute and many others have
been found facially constitutional in light of the pronouncements in Troxel.
VI. CONCLUSION
Sociological changes in the United States, such as the increase in the di-
vorce rate, have altered and highlighted the role of grandparents in our society in
the last several decades. Advances in medicine and health awareness along with
increases in wealth have created a society in which Americans live longer and
healthier lives. All of these changes have led to the increasing power of the
"elderly lobby" to influence the creation of senior-centered legislation such as
grandparent visitation statutes. These statutes alter the common law, which
favored parental autonomy and provided grandparents with no legal right to visit
their grandchildren. Today, every state in the Union has passed grandparent
visitation legislation. These statutes have come under scrutiny since the deci-
sion in Troxel v. Granville,20 5 which found Washington's nonparental visitation
statute unconstitutional because of its breadth and failure to accord any special
weight to parental preference. Unfortunately, however, Troxel's plurality opin-
ion offers little guidance to lower courts. Instead, state courts are left to make
decisions based more on subjective ideas about parental rights and the value of
grandparents to children than on specific judicial interpretations of law. With
this backdrop, the West Virginia Supreme Court, like several other state courts,
recently found its own grandparent visitation statute to be constitutional.
The future of the West Virginia grandparent visitation statute seems safe
for the foreseeable future. With Troxel, the United States Supreme Court had
the opportunity to hold all nonparental visitation statutes unconstitutional, but it
declined to do so. Since West Virginia's statute is much more narrowly tailored
than the statute invalidated in Troxel, it will likely withstand any arguments of
unconstitutionality, especially since other jurisdictions have similarly upheld
their own statutes.
West Virginia's grandparent visitation statute is different from
Washington's in several key aspects. As interpreted by the Supreme Court of
Appeals, West Virginia's statute begins with the rebuttable presumption that
206"fit" parents act in their children's best interests. In addition, the statute re-
quires a two-prong showing that visitation will be in the best interests of the
205 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
206 In the case of grandparents seeking visitation of grandchildren they are related to through a
child who has custody or visitation rights, this presumption is rebuttable by clear and convincing
evidence; if the grandparent is related to the grandchild through a child who has no custody or
visitation rights, then the grandparent need only prove that visitation would be in the best interests
of the child by a preponderance of the evidence. W. VA. CODE § 48-10-702 (2001).
[Vol. 105
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child and will not substantially interfere with the parent-child relationship. 20 7
The statute also lists twelve specific and one general factor for the court to con-
sider in determining whether to grant visitation, one of which is parental prefer-
ence. 20 8 The West Virginia Supreme Court has suggested that this factor may be
given greater weight than the other listed factors. 209 As the court claims, most of
the problems identified in Troxel are ameliorated in the West Virginia statute.
210
However, several arguments can be made that West Virginia's grand-
parent visitation statute is unconstitutional, even given the imprecise language
of Troxel. For instance, West Virginia's statute still does not require an initial
finding of harm or potential harm. Arguably, this finding is needed because the
Washington Supreme Court asserted that the Constitution required such a find-
ing of harm and in its review in Troxel, the United States Supreme Court did not
contradict this conclusion.21' Additionally, the West Virginia Supreme Court
could have found that the burden of litigating against a visitation petition was an
impermissible burden on parental rights, as suggested by the Troxel plurality.
212
Generally, grandparent visitation statutes also raise line-drawing prob-
lems.213 Is there any meaningful difference between grandparents asserting visi-
tation rights than aunts, uncles, or older siblings seeking rights to visit children
with whom they have family ties? Moreover, are these family connections
much different in character than the relationships developed by close family
friends, neighbors, or stepparents? Significantly, some states, unlike West Vir-
ginia, do not allow visitation petitions of children in intact families, but the West
Virginia Supreme Court did not address this issue in its opinion. Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, many would maintain that any nonparental visitation
statute impermissibly intrudes on a fit parent's fundamental interest in the care,
custody, and control of her children and that states do not have a compelling
interest justifying interference with parental rights. 14
Until the United States Supreme Court clarifies the appropriate standard
of review, nonparental visitation statutes will continue to be held valid under a
207 See id. § 48-10-501 (2001).
208 See supra note 153 and accompanying text (listing the factors set forth in the statute).
209 State ex rel. Brandon L. v. Moats, 551 S.E.2d 674, 685 (W. Va. 2001).
210 Id.
211 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 63.
212 Id. at 75.
213 King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 635 (Ky. 1992) (Lambert, J., dissenting).
214 See, e.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. at 91 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[A] right of parents to direct the
upbringing of their children is among the 'unalienable Rights' with which the Declaration of
Independence proclaims 'all Men ... are endowed by their Creator."'); see also id. at 80 (Thomas,
J., concurring); id. at 78-79 (Souter, J., concurring); King, 828 S.W.2d at 634 (Lambert, J. dissent-
ing) ("[M]ere improvement in quality of life is not a compelling state interest and is insufficient to
justify invasion of constitutional rights.").
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minimal intrusion (or rational basis) analysis. 215 In comparison to Washington's
extraordinarily broad visitation statute, almost any other visitation statute can be
found more narrowly tailored. Conversely, nonparental visitation statutes will
also continue to be invalidated under Troxel's analysis in jurisdictions that con-
strue their statutes narrowly. As long as state courts have the latitude to ma-
nipulate their statutes to give parental preference some special weight, they can
likely save their states' visitation statutes from pitfalls that befell Wash-
ington's visitation statute. Under that approach, West Virginia's statute was
held facially constitutional in light of Troxel's fractured opinion and vague con-
stitutional analysis, which created a safe harbor for grandparent visitation stat-
utes across the nation.
Kristina Thomas Whiteaker*
215 See 70 U.S.L.W. 3263 (2001) (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in Jack-
son v. Tangreen, 18 P.3d 100 (Ariz. 2000), which held Arizona's grandparent visitation statute
was more narrowly drawn than the Washington visitation statute in Troxel and that it is reasonably
related to furthering the state's legitimate interest in enabling children to become responsible
adults by fostering relationships with grandparents).
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